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Abstract
This paper addressed the issue of estimating the damage caused by a computer virus. First, an individual-level delayed SIR
model capturing the spreading process of a digital virus is derived. Second, the damage inflicted by the virus is modeled as the
sum of the economic losses and the cost for developing the antivirus. Next, the impact of different factors, including the delay
and the network structure, on the damage is explored by means of computer simulations. Thereby some measures of reducing
the damage of a virus are recommended. To our knowledge, this is the first time the antivirus-developing cost is taken into
account when estimating the damage of a virus.
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1. Introduction
Computer networks and online social networks provide us the channel of fast information acquisition. Meanwhile, com-
puter viruses can also spread rapidly through these networks, inflicting enormous economic losses [1]. As the major means
of defending against digital viruses, antivirus programs are capable of detecting and cleaning up viruses within infected hosts,
but are incompetent to contain virus spreading in networks. As an emerging interdiscipline, computer virus spreading dynam-
ics aims to explore propagating laws of digital infections by use of the dynamic modeling technique of infectious diseases
[2]. Since the seminal work by Kephart and White [3], large numbers of computer virus spreading models, ranging from the
population-level spreading models [4, 5, 6] and the network-level spreading models [7, 8, 9, 10, 11] to the individual-level
spreading models [12, 13, 14, 15, 16], have been proposed. In particular, the spreading process of a single computer virus
is commonly described by Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) models [17, 18, 19]. Additionally, there are some virus
spreading models that incorporate the time delay from the appearance of a virus to the release of an antivirus against the virus
[20, 21, 22].
One major concern of computer virus spreading dynamics is to estimate the overall damage inflicted by a virus. The
overall damage is composed of two parts: the economic losses incurred by the virus and the cost for developing an antivirus
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against the virus. For the estimation of the economic losses, see Refs. [23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. The cost for developing the
antivirus includes the cost for estimating the size of the antivirus to be produced, the cost for estimating the effort required,
the cost for developing preliminary project schedules, the cost for estimating overall cost of the project, and the cost for
producing the antivirus. The estimation of the antivirus development cost is one of the most challenging tasks in antivirus
project management [28, 29]. In real scenarios, the release of the antivirus always lags behind the appearance of the targeted
computer virus, and the time delay has a significant influence on the overall damage. When the delay is large, the users of
infected hosts would suffer from huge economic losses. However, a reduction of the delay can only be achieved at the expense
of a higher antivirus development cost, because it would consume more manpower and financial resources. Therefore, an
elaborate tradeoff between the economic losses and the antivirus development cost must be made, so as to minimize the
overall damage caused by the digital virus. To our knowledge, previous literatures on computer virus have never taken the
antivirus development cost into account.
This paper addressed the issue of estimating the overall damage of a computer virus. First, an individual-level delayed
SIR model capturing the spreading process of a digital virus is proposed. Second, the overall damage of the virus is quanti-
fied. Next, the impact of different factors, including the delay and the network structure, on the virus damage is uncovered
experimentally, thereby some measures of reducing the overall damage are recommended. To our knowledge, this is the first
time the antivirus cost is taken into account when estimating the damage of a virus.
The subsequent materials of this work are organized as follows. Section 2 models the damage of a computer virus. Section
3 experimentally explores the influence of different factors on the damage. Finally, Section 4 closes this work.
2. Measuring the overall damage
This section aims to model the damage inflicted by a computer virus. For that purpose, let us introduce some notions,
notations and hypotheses as follows.
2.1. Notions, notations and hypotheses
Suppose the network in concern consists of N hosts labelled 1, 2, · · · N. Let A =
(
ai j
)
N×N denote the adjacency matrix of
the network, i.e., ai j = 1 or 0 according as host j can directly infect host i or not. Suppose a virus appears in the network at
time t = 0, and there is a delay of τ time units from the appearance of the virus to the release of an antivirus against the virus.
The task of this paper is to estimate the damage inflicted by the virus in the time interval [0,T ] , where T > τ.
As with the traditional SIR model, it is assumed that, at any time, every host in the network is in one of three possible
states: susceptible, infected, and recovered. Susceptible hosts are hosts that are not infected with the virus but are susceptible
to it, because they have not acquired the antivirus. Infected hosts are hosts that are infected with the virus. Recovered hosts
are hosts that are not infected with the virus and are immune to it, because they have acquired the antivirus. Let Xi(t) = 0, 1,
and 2 denote that, at time t, host i is susceptible, infected, and recovered, respectively. Let S i(t), Ii(t), and Ri(t) denote the
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probability that host i is susceptible, infected, and recovered at time t, respectively. That is,
S i(t) = Pr{Xi(t) = 0}, Ii(t) = Pr{Xi(t) = 1}, Ri(t) = Pr{Xi(t) = 2}.
As S i(t) + Ii(t) + Ri(t) ≡ 1, the vector
(I1(t), · · · , IN(t),R1(t), · · · ,RN(t))T
captures the state of the network at time t. Next, let us impose a set of hypotheses as follows.
(H1) Due to the infection by neighboring infected hosts, at time t ∈ [0,T ] a susceptible host i gets infected at rate β∑Nj=1 ai jI j(t),
where β > 0 is referred to as the infection force.
(H2) Due to the action of the antivirus, at time t ∈ [τ,T ] every infected host becomes recovered at rate γ, where γ > 0 is
referred to as the recovery rate.
(H3) Due to the action of the antivirus, at time t ∈ [τ,T ] every susceptible host becomes recovered at rate θ, where θ > 0 is
referred to as the vaccination rate.
(H4) The loss per unit time suffered by each infected host is one unit.
(H5) Due to that the cost for developing an antivirus against the virus goes up sharply when τ approaches zero, the antivirus
development cost is A
τα
, where A > 0 is referred to as the cost coefficient, α > 0 is referred to as the cost index.
Fig. 1 shows hypotheses (H1)-(H3) schematically.
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Figure 1: Diagram of hypotheses (H1)-(H3).
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2.2. A delayed SIR model
Let ∆t be a very small time interval. For 1 ≤ i ≤ N, hypotheses (H1)-(H3) imply the following equations.
Pr{Xi(t + ∆t) = 1 | Xi(t) = 0} = β∆t
N∑
j=1
ai jI j(t) + o(∆t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
Pr{Xi(t + ∆t) = 2 | Xi(t) = 0} = 0, 0 ≤ t < τ − ∆t,
Pr{Xi(t + ∆t) = 2 | Xi(t) = 0} = θ∆t + o(∆t), τ − ∆t ≤ t ≤ T,
Pr{Xi(t + ∆t) = 2 | Xi(t) = 1} = 0, 0 ≤ t < τ − ∆t,
Pr{Xi(t + ∆t) = 2 | Xi(t) = 1} = γ∆t + o(∆t), τ − ∆t ≤ t ≤ T.
So, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N, we have
Pr{Xi(t + ∆t) = 0 | Xi(t) = 0} = 1 − β∆t
N∑
j=1
ai jI j(t) + o(∆t), 0 ≤ t < τ − ∆t,
Pr{Xi(t + ∆t) = 0 | Xi(t) = 0} = 1 − β∆t
N∑
j=1
ai jI j(t) − θ∆t + o(∆t), τ − ∆t ≤ t ≤ T,
Pr{Xi(t + ∆t) = 1 | Xi(t) = 1} = 1, 0 ≤ t < τ − ∆t,
Pr{Xi(t + ∆t) = 1 | Xi(t) = 1} = 1 − γ∆t + o(∆), τ − ∆t ≤ t ≤ T.
By the total probability formula, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N, we have
Ii(t + ∆t) = [1 − Ii(t)]β∆t
N∑
j=1
ai jI j(t) + Ii(t) + o(∆t), 0 ≤ t < τ − ∆t,
Ii(t + ∆t) = [1 − Ii(t) − Ri(t)]β∆t
N∑
j=1
ai jI j(t) + Ii(t)(1 − γ∆t) + o(∆t), τ − ∆t ≤ t ≤ T,
Ri(t + ∆t) = 0, 0 ≤ t < τ − ∆t,
Ri(t + ∆t) = [1 − Ii(t) − Ri(t)]θ∆t + Ii(t)γ∆t + Ri(t) + o(∆t), τ − ∆t ≤ t ≤ T.
Transposing, dividing both sides by ∆t, and letting ∆t → 0, we get the following dynamical model.
dIi(t)
dt
= β[1 − Ii(t)]
N∑
j=1
ai jI j(t), 0 ≤ t < τ, 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
dIi(t)
dt
= β[1 − Ii(t) − Ri(t)]
N∑
j=1
ai jI j(t) − γIi(t), τ ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
dRi(t)
dt
= 0, 0 ≤ t < τ, 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
dRi(t)
dt
= θ[1 − Ii(t) − Ri(t)] + γIi(t), τ ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
We refer to the model as the delayed SIR model.
4
2.3. Measuring the overall damage
By hypothesis (H4), the expected economic loss caused by the virus is∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
Ii(t)dt,
On the other hand, it follows from hypothesis (H5) that the antivirus development cost is
A
τα
.
Hence, the average overall damage of the virus is
Damage =
∫ T
0
N∑
i=1
Ii(t)dt +
A
τα
.
3. The influence of different factors on the overall damage
This section is devoted to exploring the influence of different factors on the overall damage of a computer virus through
simulation experiments.
In our experiments, the value ranges of all the model parameters are specified as follows. β ∈ [0.005, 0.016], γ ∈ [0, 1, 0.3],
θ ∈ [0.1, 0.3], A ∈ [500, 600], α ∈ [1, 6], and τ ∈ [1, 20]. The underlying network is taken from a set of five different scale-free
networks with 100 nodes, 109 edges, and respective power exponents (2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 3.0, 3.1) [30], or from a set of five different
small-world networks with 100 nodes, 200 edges, and respective edge-rewiring probability (0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3) [31], or
to be a realistic network from the database of Stanford University[32].
3.1. The influence of the three dynamic parameters
To understand the influence of the three dynamic parameters (the infection force, the treatment rate, and the vaccination
rate) on the overall damage, we present Fig. 2, where each data point is obtained by averaging over 104 runs of the delayed
SIR model with different parameter combinations and on different scale-free networks (or different small-world networks, or
the realistic network). Thereby, the following conclusions are drawn.
(a) With the rise of the infection force, the overall damage goes up.
(b) With the rise of the treatment rate, the overall damage goes down.
(c) With the rise of the vaccination rate, the overall damage goes down.
These conclusions manifest that the overall damage caused by a computer virus can be diminished by reducing the infection
force, or by enhancing the treatment rate, or by enhancing the vaccination rate. In practical applications, a host user can
reduce the infection force of computer viruses by avoiding taking dangerous actions such as browsing suspicious web pages
and opening suspicious email attachments, and can enhance the treatment/vaccination rate by timely updating and running
antivirus software.
5
380
360
340
320
300
T
h
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
14x10
-3
121086
The infection force β
 the scale-free network
 the small-world network
 the realistic network
(a)
340
320
300
280
260
T
h
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
0.300.250.200.150.10
The treatment rate γ
(b)
 the scale-free network
 the small-world network
 the realistic network
310
305
300
295
T
h
e
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
0.300.250.200.150.10
The vaccination rate θ
 the scale-free network
 the small-world network
 the realistic network
(c)
Figure 2: The average overall damage vs. the three dynamic parameters. Each data point is obtained by averaging over 104 runs of the delayed SIR
model with different parameter combinations and on different scale-free networks (or different small-world networks, or the realistic network).
3.2. The influence of the two cost parameters
To understand the influence of the two cost parameters (the cost coefficient and the cost exponent) on the overall damage,
we present Fig. 3, where each data point is obtained by averaging over 104 runs of the delayed SIR model with different
parameter combinations and on different scale-free networks (or different small-world networks, or the realistic network).
Thereby, the following conclusions are drawn.
(a) With the rise of the cost coefficient, the overall damage goes up.
(b) With the rise of the cost exponent, the overall damage goes down.
These conclusions manifest that the overall damage caused by a computer virus can be diminished by reducing the cost
coefficient or by enhancing the cost exponent. In real world applications, the cost for developing an antivirus can be reduced
by accurately estimating the workload needed for the development task and building an excellent team for the antivirus
development.
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Figure 3: The average overall damage vs. the two cost parameters. Each data point is obtained by averaging over 104 runs of the delayed SIR model with
different parameter combinations and on different scale-free networks (or different small-world networks, or the realistic network).
3.3. The influence of the time delay
To understand the influence of the time delay on the overall damage, we present Fig. 4, where each data point is obtained by
averaging over 104 runs of the delayed SIR model with different parameter combinations and on different scale-free networks
6
(or different small-world networks, or the realistic network).. Thereby, the following conclusions are drawn.
(a) There is a threshold such that (a) when the delay is below the threshold, the overall damage goes down with the rise of
the delay, and (b) when the delay exceeds the threshold, the overall damage goes up with the rise of the delay.
In practical uses, an elaborate tradeoff must be made between the economic losses caused by a computer virus and the cost
for developing an antivirus against the virus, so as to minimize the overall damage inflicting by the virus.
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Figure 4: The average overall damage vs. the time delay. Each data point is obtained by averaging over 104 runs of the delayed SIR model with different
parameter combinations and on different scale-free networks (or different small-world networks, or the realistic network).
3.4. The influence of the network structure
To understand the influence of the network structure on the overall damage, we present Fig. 5, where each data point
is obtained by averaging over 104 runs of the delayed SIR model with different parameter combinations and on a specific
scale-free network (or a specific small-world network). Thereby, the following conclusions are drawn.
(a) With the rise of the heterogeneity of a scale-free network, the overall damage goes up.
(b) With the rise of the randomness of a small-world network, the overall damage goes up.
These conclusions manifest that the overall damage can be reduced by organizing a network in a more homogeneous way
or a more regular way. In practice, enterprises can reduce the damage caused by computer viruses by constructing intranets
with homogeneous or regular structures.
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Figure 5: The average overall damage vs. the network structure. Each data point is obtained by averaging over 104 runs of the delayed SIR model with
different parameter combinations and on a specific scale-free network (or a specific small-world network).
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4. Conclusions
The issue of estimating the overall damage of a computer virus has been addressed. By introducing an individual-level
delayed SIR model, the overall damage of the virus has been modeled. The impact of different factors, including the delay
and the network structure, on the damage has been uncovered through comprehensive simulation experiments.
Towards this direction, there are still a number of problems that are worth study. For example, the model should be
extended to more sophisticated virus spreading models such as the impulsive spreading models [33, 34, 35], the stochastic
spreading models [36, 37, 38], and the spreading models on time-varying networks [39, 40, 41]. As another instance, the
methodology developed in this work can be employed to estimate the damage incurred by a rumor [42, 43].
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